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Abstract. The message of this note is that in a general equilibrium setting the 
compensating variation is numéraire dependent. In contrast, the equivalent 
variation is neutral regarding the choice of value units. We illustrate with a simple 
example and propose an even simpler solution to overcome this bias in the 
compensating variation; all that is required to have a correct welfare estimate is to 
compensate the compensating variation by normalization with a price index. This 
type of correction is necessary to overcome the often blind implementation of 
welfare measures in numerical general equilibrium. 
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1. The set up. 
Welfare evaluation relies heavily in the use of the compensating and 
equivalent variation measures, CV and EV respectively, for comparing 
equilibrium states. They are exact welfare measures, have a clear cut 
interpretation in terms of income, give bounds for consumer surplus for normal 
goods, and solve the problems of directly using utility levels (Willig, 1976). 
Utilities are just ordinal and thus any literal interpretation beyond the sign of 
the change in utilities between two equilibrium states is not justified. Assume 
well behaved consumers so that all demand functions, Marshallian and Hicksian, 
have the standard properties. From the utility maximization problem we derive 
the indirect utility function ( , )v p m , which gives maximal utility at prices p and 
income m. In turn, the solution of the expenditure minimization problem yields 
the expenditure function ( , )e p u . It gives the minimal cost of achieving utility u 
at prices p. Both optimization problems will share, under standard conditions, 
the same optimal consumption bundle if we make ( , ( , ))m e p v p m and
( , ( , ))u v p e p u (Varian, 1992; Mas-Colell et al, 1995).  
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From an agent’s perspective, optimal consumption decisions only require 
knowledge of the vector of market prices p and that agent’s income level m. 
Consider now two equilibrium states (0: original, 1: final) from this agent’s 
viewpoint. All the relevant information for this individual decision making is 
contained in the pairs (p0, m0) and (p1, m1).  
For this individual, welfare changes between the two equilibrium states, from 
u0 to u1 in utility terms, can be measured by the compensating and equivalent 
variations, CV and EV, with expressions: 
1 1 1 0CV ( , ) ( , )e p u e p u   
0 1 0 0EV ( , ) ( , )e p u e p u   
Since we are aiming at a negative result, it is sufficient to show it under 
simplified conditions. For this, we assume that the utility function is linearly 
homogeneous. Under this condition (which includes all the standard CES 
functions) it is well-known that the expenditure function is multiplicatively 
separable: e(p,u)=e(p,1) u, with e(p,1) being the expenditure necessary to 
achieve a unit of utility. Take the expression for CV and use this separability 
property to obtain:  
1 1 1 0 1 1 0CV ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,1) ( )e p u e p u e p u u         
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )( ,1) ( , )u u u u u ue p u e p u m
u u u
         




( )EV u um
u
   
2. The general equilibrium issue. 
Notice that the selection of a numéraire to represent the equilibrium price 
vector will not have any effect on the utility ratios that appear in the CV and 
EV expressions. Under general equilibrium, however, income levels are price 
dependent. We may represent this by writing m(p0) and m(p1). Not only this, 
the choice of numéraire will affect the expression of income in the initial and 
final equilibriums. However, in numerical general equilibrium applications this 
only matters for the final equilibrium state. The reason is that the 
implementation of the initial equilibrium requires the selection of special units 
so that all empirically observed value magnitudes can be separated into value 
units and physical units. The natural option is to select (fictitious) units in such 
a way that a physical fictitious unit has a worth of 1 dollar. These fictitious 
physical units are then used under any counterfactual equilibrium. With this 
calibration trick all goods have initial prices equal to 1, even the numéraire, 
whichever good it happens to be. This gives complete freedom in the initial 
selection of the numéraire. Notice too that thanks to the calibration procedure, 
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that sets all prices equal to 1, EV is always well defined and has a constant 
value, regardless of the initially selected numéraire. When the equilibrium 
changes, however, the choice of numéraire becomes relevant to measure final 
income levels and, therefore, it has an effect on the expression of CV. A direct 
comparison of EV and CV might be misleading since they are evaluated at 
different equilibrium prices. More on this in the example below.  
 
3. A simple example and a simpler solution. 
Take a consumer in a two good exchange economy. This consumer owns 
endowments ω=(2,8) and is described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
u(x1,x2)= 0.51 2( )x x . 
 Initial equilibrium prices are p0=(1,1) and good 1 is the numéraire. The 
equilibrium consumption for this agent is x0=(5,5), his income is m0=10 and his 
optimal utility is u0=5. Some shock, say a tax policy, perturbs now the 
equilibrium and the new equilibrium price vector turns out to be p1=(1,2). For 
these prices, the consumer’s equilibrium figures become x1=(9,4.5), m1=18, 
u1=6.36. Welfare effects using the expressions above give EV=2.73, CV=3.86 
(with EV<CV)  
Change now the numéraire to good 2. Since relative prices would not change, 
prices would take the expression p1=(0.5,1). The equilibrium consumption 
bundle and utility level would be unaffected, but income would now be m1=9. 
The measure of the compensating variation would change to CV=1.93 (with 
EV>CV). Something is amiss when depending on the numéraire the relationship 
between CV and EV shifts. Notice that everything has been rescaled by a factor 
of ½, the same factor used in re-dimensioning the vector price. The question is 
how to report the CV in a way that is independent of the arbitrary and 
apparently innocuous choice of numéraire. In the example we have played with 
two possible numéraires but there are in fact infinitely many possibilities. Any 
unit of value that keeps the relative price p1/p2 in the final equilibrium equal to 
½ would do. Although the welfare sign would always be correctly captured, the 
estimated volume would be misleading if not reported correctly. Inadvertently, 
applied general equilibrium practitioners have been using, reporting and 
ascribing literal value to the CV welfare measure paying no attention to the 
crucial role played by the numéraire.  
The solution is straightforward and requires that CV is itself compensated to 
eliminate any nominal effects induced by the choice of numéraire. Any price 
index 1p  based on equilibrium prices p1 will make the calculation for the 
compensating variation independent of the selected numéraire with a constant 
value of CV/ 1p , regardless of the selected good used as numéraire. Therefore all 
that remains is the selection of a price index. If we wish to measure the 
purchasing power of income, a consumers’ price index would just do.  
Another example of the same type of numéraire induced bias would occur 
when calculating the true index of cost of living (Konüs, 1939) in a general 
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equilibrium model. This index is defined by =e(p1,u)/e(p0,u). For a linearly 
homogeneous utility function the index simplifies to =e(p1,1)/e(p0,1) and both 
the Laspeyres (utility reference u0) and Paasche (utility reference u1) versions 
coincide. For the same consumer of the example we calculate minimal 
expenditures for unitary utilities in both equilibrium states. For the initial 
equilibrium p0=(1,1) we would find e(p0,1)=2. After the equilibrium is perturbed 
and good 1 is the numéraire, we calculate the minimal expenditure at prices 
p1=(1,2) and obtain e(p1,1)= 2.83 with the Konüs index being =1.41. We now 
change the numéraire to being good 2, the price vector is now p1=(0.5,1), with 
minimal expenditure reaching e(p1,1)= 1.41 and thus =0.71. Notice, as before, 
that everything has been rescaled by a factor of ½. The question becomes, once 
again, how to report the Konüs index in a way that is independent of the choice 
of numéraire. The answer is that, here too, we should rely on a price index 1p  
and then report / 1p as the corrected true index of cost living. This value is 
independent of the chosen unit of value in the general equilibrium model. 
For utilities that are not linearly homogeneous the same problems occur, and 
the same type of solution applies. The only practical difference is that 
calculations cannot use the simplified expressions for EV and CV, and for  as 
well, that have allowed us to visualize directly where and how the measurement 
problem manifests itself. 
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